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As digital technology revolutionises the world, it is not surprising that it is altering the way states 
conduct themselves, especially in terms of war. War is a powerful policy tool of states and its 
implications are massive. This thesis looks at how existing definitions of war are insufficient in dealing 
with cyberwar and what are the implications by relying on them. It addresses a gap within political 
science of the nature of cyberwar and how it relates to the concepts of violence, legitimacy, targets, 
and political outcomes. This thesis highlights how a reluctance to reassess war as a solely physical 
phenomenon is problematic. Using a heuristic comparative case study analysis of i) Stuxnet (Israel and 
US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities); (ii) Russian election interference in the 2016 US Presidential 
Election; and (iii) NotPetya (Russian cyberattacks on the Ukraine), a foundational theory is developed. 
This foundation is built around a concept of an extended causal chain that better describes the 
mechanisms through which cyberwar is an effective tool. This will provide a basis for further research 
to build on, as the field is impeded by a lack of data to conduct rigorous theory testing.  
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1. Introduction 
When one thinks of war, often fields of soldiers with weapons in their hands, and corpses littered in 
between come to mind. There is a sense of chaos and physical destruction. This image reflects how 
wars have been fought for thousands of years. Perhaps, you conjured a more modern image: tanks, 
airpower, bombs, drones flying over foreign lands. This too makes sense, with the history of WWI and 
WWII being oft studied and war in the Middle East defining a new generation. These images however, 
despite technological advances, have one thing in common. They rely on physical destruction through 
munitions.  
Political science literature also reflects this physical nature of war. Theorists and practitioners have 
dedicated many volumes to how the interactions between states and their numbers of munitions, 
military strategies, and global interconnection has shaped war. However, the invention and massive 
uptake of the internet has revolutionised how war can be conducted.   
Internet-based technologies have weaved their way into almost every facet of modern life. Digital 
technology can and is used for warfare and aggression between states - a shift from the physical world 
into the intangible – cyberspace. 0s and 1s, pulses of electricity or electromagnetic waves, travelling 
through undersea cables and the air, can be weaponised.  We live in a period of near total saturation 
of devices that civilian lives can, quite literally, rely on. This means that the risks associated with 
cyberwar have multiplied.   
In a way, this weaponisation is fitting given the internet was created by the US military; albeit as a 
solution to “how do government officials and military officers communicate and maintain control in 
the aftermath of global thermonuclear war?” (Streck 2013, p.18). The internet can be used to wreak 
havoc as an instrument of war as humans and our surroundings become increasingly (inter)connected. 
Former White House security advisors, Richard Clarke and Rob Knake provide an ominous description 
of a worst-case cyberwar scenario:  
“…classified Defence networks are compromised […] oil refineries are on fire and 
exploding, releasing toxic fumes, simultaneously chlorine gas is being released from 
chemical plants. Air traffic control is wiped out, […] trains have derailed or collide as 
signals are taken offline. The financial system is in meltdown as the servers that 
manage the entire banking system have been compromised.”  
(2010, p.47). 
Given this destructive potential, it is important that cyberwar be investigated further so that 
governments can determine how to best protect their citizens. For the field of political science, this 
research is important because whilst the literature has begun to address the possibility of cyberwar, 
it is often rooted in an understanding of conventional war. Based on the available literature today, it 
is unclear whether Clarke and Knake’s scenario would be captured as a war, if caused by a foreign 
state. Whereas, if a state were to cause that kind of damage using munitions, it is highly likely that a 
war would be declared.  
As the world in which states conduct themselves has been revolutionised by Information 
Communication Technologies (ICTs), it is important that political science too evolves the definitions 
and assumptions from the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries that underpin the mechanisms of international 
relations (IR) theory and more specifically for this thesis, war.  
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1.1 The Problématique 
At the beginning of any new epoch there is a period of transition where old definitions that shaped 
the past begin to give way to definitions that will shape the future. This thesis argues that how we 
think about and define interstate warfare is an important definition to reassess. Especially because 
the current literature is deeply connected to definitions of war created when airpower did not exist, 
let alone the internet. Thomas Rid, in casting doubt about cyberwar inadvertently illuminated this, 
“commentators fail to grapple with a basic question: What counts as warfare?” (2013.b). For Rid and 
many of his contemporaries, war is still as described in the opening paragraph – violent and physically 
destructive. However, this type of warfare is no longer representative of how states are using new 
capabilities.  
The changes that have been occurring that this thesis argues warrant further investigation into the 
changing nature of war are: (i) a change in the nature of violence; (ii) changes to the concept of 
legitimacy; (iii) a broader possibility of targets; and (iv) a change in expected and possible outcomes.  
Whilst there are sub-categories, e.g. guerrilla, naval, and information war, that already exist and 
address these points, the concept of war is based on kinetic capabilities. 1  The thinkers and 
practitioners who have relied on and developed these sub-categories of war had no possible way of 
knowing how war could be conducted in the future when they formed those definitions. 
 
1.2 Research Question and Aim 
By answering the following research questions this thesis aims to lay the groundwork for full theory 
development of incorporating cyberwar as a feature of war. Recognising that digital technologies 
have reshaped that world and the tools available to states. The two research questions are:  
How is the current definition of war (within political science) insufficient to properly explain cyberwar? 
What are the implications of relying on established definitions of war in relation to cyberwar?  
 
1.3 Outline 
This thesis will begin by exploring modern international relations theory and how it attempts to 
explain interstate relations and war. It will proceed by exploring in greater depth the nature of war 
and the limitations that these traditional understandings of war pose in the present. Thirdly, this thesis 
will delve into cyberspace and cyberattacks. These sections will attempt to only be as technical as 
necessary in order to shape understanding in the political realm and will not examine specificity of 
how these attacks are carried out. Fourthly, the most likely targets in a cyberwar will be specified. 
Fifth, drawing on the above, this thesis will explore what cyberwar is, making linkages specifically back 
to IR theories and war. Sixth, a heuristic multi-case study will be conducted to create a framework for 
future theory development in this area. Finally, a results and concluding section will form a foundation 
of a new theory of war.   
 
1 i.e. based on physical munitions. 
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2. International Relations (IR) Theory 
Presently, the body of literature that addresses the nature of state relations, inclusive of war, is IR 
theory. Since the end of WWII and then after the Cold War, there has been a stability in the 
international system that has tempered the warring nature of states. This relative stability led to the 
development of modern IR theory. There are two main paradigms, realism, and liberalism. Both rely 
on different assumptions from which sub-theories have developed. These theories are not exhaustive 
but they aim to explain state relations through “mutual deterrence and balanced arms control, 
stability and instability, national interests and international security; […] crisis management, regional 
integration, and the viability of alliances under strain” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2000, p.1). The 
theories developed attempt to explain relations between states in times of peace and how war can 
be avoided, but also what precipitates the outbreak of war (Levy 1998, pp.141-143).  
 
2.1 Realism 
Realism is the formalisation of centuries of philosophical thought about the nature of human beings 
and by extension the nation-state. At the heart of realism is a Hobbesian idea that humans are 
inherently violent; therefore, so are states (see Hobbes 1651). In a way, there is a paradox at the heart 
of the nation-state, it has been noted that the state is born of war and war is born out of states 
(Kapferer 2004; Porter 2002). Porter says, “war is an organising force,” not only does warfare require 
the mass ordering of society to produce enough resources to sustain a war (e.g. munitions, skilled 
fighters etc.) but this order also shapes the nation-state (2002, p.1). It is a state’s capacity to use their 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence to both enable domestic law and order, but also to defend 
itself from external threats or seek expansion.  
The formalisation of these ideas produced a set of basic assumptions that explain state relations and 
why they go to war. Namely that: (i) states are the primary agents; (ii) states are rational; (iii) states 
are security maximisers in a zero-sum world, i.e. power is relative; and (iv) the international system is 
anarchic, i.e. there is no universal authority (James 1995, p.183; Waltz 2010). This anarchic 
environment and the desire to always be a security maximiser, could create the conditions for a 
rationally acting state to go to war to maximise their security by eliminating another state or their 
military capabilities.  
Within realism, two of the best theories to explain tensions between states are deterrence theory and 
the security dilemma. Deterrence theory has four components: (i) a ‘red line’ in which behaviour that 
crosses it is unacceptable; (ii) communication of this red line to an adversary, such that they know 
violations will be punished; (iii) the capability to carry out the threat; and (iv) in the case of non-
compliance, carrying out the threat (Jervis 1979 & 1989). Ultimately, the failure of a state to obey the 
command of another could lead to war as (iv) is enacted. 
Secondly, the security dilemma argues that as states increase their military capabilities to defend 
themselves, other states become increasingly nervous that they are under threat and accordingly 
increase their own security. Jervis was an early pioneer of this theory, linking it to the game theory 
game stag hunt. Whereby cooperation is often the best outcome for all parties involved; however, 
many are often tempted to seek their own security in the hope that others disarm (Jervis 1978, pp.167-
168; Glaser 1997, p.171). The security dilemma posits that as states become hyperaware of security 
and relative power, each increasing their own leads to a spiralling arms race, which makes it more 
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likely for states to make mistakes or remain stuck in predetermined ideas and shut down the possibility 
to take in new information and due to the increase in military capabilities could make an ensuing 
misstep more violent (Van Evera 1998).  
Shortcomings of realism are its reliance on clear communication and the ability for states to conduct 
a rational calculus on the information that they have. If the information is incomplete or failed to be 
communicated correctly, it is possible that a state acts against their own interest.  As will be explored 
later, this has implications when looked at later in relation to cyberwar (Section 8.2).  
 
2.2 Liberalism 
Liberalism shares some assumptions with realism but has several notable differences. One key 
difference is that power is a positive sum game, i.e. one state’s gain in security is not necessarily the 
loss of another’s; collectively security can be gained without minimising the security of other states. 
Liberalism argues that through interdependence, the anarchic system described by realists can be 
mitigated, thereby reducing the likelihood of the security dilemma from occurring (Nye 1988). Another 
tenant of liberalism is democratic peace theory, which states that liberal democracies do not go to 
war with other democracies (Buchan 2002, p.407).  
Interestingly, the liberal war thesis suggests that war is, paradoxically, an inbuilt feature of liberalism’s 
desire for peace and freedom. Dillon and Reid suggest that liberalism is reliant on a commitment to 
war, it is an actively sought-after policy tool that governs both its internal functioning through states 
of emergencies and war preparedness but also its external relations in terms of spreading peace and 
freedom (2009, p.8). For example, this appears to be true for many of the wars that the US has been 
involved in in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.  
Liberalism has arguably tempered war, condemning the use of total war,2 and establishing a more 
formal set of rules about it. Nevertheless, it has patently been a beneficiary of war. Dillion and Reid 
note that the political transformation that the two World Wars enabled was far greater than that 
achieved by social and political reformers (2009, p.9). Liberal war theory suggests wars that promote 
freedom and peace are legitimate, despite international humanitarian law (IHL; an important part of 
liberalism’s attempt to temper the inherent anarchy of the system) paradoxically requiring the 
opposite. Dillon and Reid add that this is just one type of war and that liberal states can war for 
geopolitical reasons too (2009, p.84).  
 
2.3 IR Theory Shift 
In the late 20th century, democratic peace theory seemed to win the debate, with war by developed 
Western states declared “subrationally unthinkable – rejected […] because it remains subconscious 
and never comes off as a coherent possibility” (Mueller in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2000, p.3). Whilst 
this may have resulted in states limiting their use of force and drawn out wars, as liberalism has long 
sought, it has not tempered liberal states’ use of violence. There have still been many battle-related 
deaths in interstate conflicts (Figure 1) and it has been said that “major war, not war in general […] is 
obsolete” (Mandelbaum 1998, p.20). This, as will be seen later, reflects the nature of cyberwar, which 
 
2 Total war refers to war that abides by no rules or norms. That is, civilians are an acceptable target, the same 
as a military target.  
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does not require the same scale of war to occur. Rather, highly targeted attacks can be effective 
without inflicting death to such a degree.   
As war evolves, our understanding of IR will also need to evolve as they are grounded in a specific 
understanding of how states conduct themselves, in times of peace and war. If how states behave 
during war is fundamentally different then the calculus of these theories may prove incorrect and may 
no longer predict state relations.  
 
Figure 1: Interstate Battle-Related Deaths by Regions, 1989-2018 (UCDP 2020.a). 
 
3. War 
The etymology of war, verwirren, meaning ‘to confuse, perplex’, provides a helpful basis for 
understanding war. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (500 BCE) also noted that, “all warfare is based on 
deception,” and, “in the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity.” There is such diversity and nuance 
in what war is, that we must analyse it, so we are aware of the limitations of existing definitions (Most 
and Starr 1983, p.139). By analysing two core components of war, this section explores the existent 
conceptualisation of war and highlights some of the emerging changes. The first section will explore 
why war is conducted before proceeding to violence, or the what of war. Finally, by examining 
legitimacy, a greater understanding of who can conduct war, when they can conduct it, and how they 
can conduct it will be gained.  
 
3.1 War as a Political Tool 
To begin, it is important to understand why war exists, why would a state use such a catastrophic thing? 
Bruce Porter wrote that (emphasis original),  
Wars are not mere intermissions in a human drama of relentless progress; their 
organisational residues are woven too deeply into the fabric of modern politics for 
that. But neither is war necessarily an engine of progress. It is instead a powerful 
catalyst of change, the direction of which is always morally problematic and often 
deleterious in effect.  
 (2002, p.9) 
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Porter is building on the concept introduced earlier, that the nature of a state is one of war, “states 
make war, but war also makes states.” (p.14). This provides a useful segue to one of the most enduring 
definitions of war, from an 18th century Prussian General and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz 
(2007 [1832]).  
1. War is a natural, primal violence born of hatred; 
2. War is instrumental, there must be a means (force) and an end (goal); and  
3. War is political in nature, ‘the mere continuation of politics by other means.’ War is an act of 
policy. 
War is a political tool available to governments to achieve political outcomes. This means that states 
have carried out a rational cost-benefit analysis and determined that violence is the best way for them 
to achieve their goals (e.g. territorial expansion). Though, it has been noted that often wars do not 
lead to the desired outcomes of the aggressor state (Sullivan 2007). Ultimately, war exists as the final 
defence or forceful implementation of diplomatic interests, as a last resort of conflict resolution or 
territorial expansion (Holsti 1996).  
 
3.2 Violence 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines violence as “the deliberate exercise of physical force against a 
person, property, etc.” The physical force component underpins the idea of kinetic war, and up until 
the development of the internet, was the only possible form of warfare. Even psychological warfare 
has been reliant on the trauma of kinetic war, or dissemination of news and propaganda through 
pamphlets or newspapers (Doob 1949; Speier 1948, p.7). The inclusion of ‘deliberate’ introduces the 
concept of legitimacy, which will be addressed later. 
In his exploration of the concept of violence, Benjamin Valentino has two key observations. Firstly, 
pre-1990s, political scientists’ focus was not on violence per se but rather the causes of war; therefore, 
the conclusion drawn was that violence against civilians, in particular, was irrational and random. 
Subsequently however, the conclusion that violence is “primarily, if not exclusively, instrumental and 
coordinated by powerful actors seeking to achieve tangible political or military objectives,” has been 
formed (2014, p.91). Violence plays a specific purpose and can be actively used to achieve certain 
outcomes.  
Koloma Beck and Werron have created a model to understand violence in general (Figure 2). Their 
model shows the interaction between three entities when an act of violence occurs. The entities are 
the performer – who carries out the violence; the target – who suffers harm; and an observer – who 
sees the action. For this thesis, we can equate the performer and target as state(s) and the observer 
at the international community, and on a subnational level, civilians. 
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Figure 2: The triangular dynamics of violence (Koloma Beck and Werron 2018, p.281).  
 
Intuitively, one might limit their analysis of violence as between two actors, the ‘performer’ and the 
‘target’. However, Koloma Beck and Werron argue this is insufficient because violence can be 
extremely contextual, especially across borders and over time. This model emphasises the existence 
of social aspects to acts of violence. “Violence is a matter of observation of, and discourse about 
physical action,” they conclude (2018, p.280). This is illustrated by describing the Hobbesian monopoly 
of violence, with different formulations, “‘military’ or ‘police operations,’ ‘humanitarian interventions,’ 
‘arrests,’ or ‘preventive custody.’”  
Violence in the context of war, traditionally occurs in a primary sense, that is, casualties as a direct 
result of a kinetic object (e.g. bullets, munitions dropped etc.). The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS) compiled a capability matrix for modern militaries about what attributes should be 
possessed by ‘Global Military Powers’ (see Appendix A; Giegerich, Childs and Hackett 2018). These 
are the tools available to powers who want to pursue war.  Of the 11 criteria the IISS maps out, ten of 
them are kinetic capabilities, the 11th recognises the role of cyber. This matrix shows that there is a 
strong bias for militaries to acquire kinetic capabilities over cyber, focussing on the intrinsic physical 
and kinetic nature of violence. 
Moreover, this is the yardstick that the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) uses to define war; 
where a war is defined by the number of casualties, ‘a state-based conflict or dyad which reaches at 
least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a specific calendar year’ (UCDP 2020.b).3 This definition means 
that unless there are substantial deaths, a specific violent event(s) will not be considered war. 
However, technology has meant that these definitions that rely on both primary kinetic events and 
specific levels of lethality which do not necessarily reflect the nature of violence in modern war and 
how new capabilities inflict their violence in an indirect fashion. For example, if electricity grids are 
crippled, no one may directly be harmed; however, people in hospitals reliant on electricity may die 
because of the attack. This is a major point of departure as a new theory of war is developed. 
Capabilities have altered how war can be conducted, which in turn, requires an improved 
understanding of the consequences of this.  
 
 
3 Where a conflict is, ‘an armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.’ And a dyad as, ‘two actors, with one or 
more being the government, that have a stated incompatibility’. (Pettersson 2019, pp.4).  
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3.2.2 Reduction in Physical Violence 
As technologies have advanced, some authors have put forward theories of nonlethal war, 
questioning the essentiality of violence to war. David Morehouse defines nonlethal weaponry as being 
able to incapacitate a “warring effort without causing significant injury, excessive destruction of 
personal property, or widespread environmental damage.” (1996, p.12). Therefore, technologies 
available to states to conduct war potentially could reduce the lethality of war, corresponding with a 
dramatic reduction in violence. Technology has deemphasised the need for extreme violence as 
similar outcomes can be gained through less violent means. That is, extreme violence may not be a 
core means of war to achieve some political end as that same end can be obtained through non-lethal 
means.  
3.2.3 Ideological Violence  
One thing that is not addressed readily in the literature is whether state attacks on democratic 
apparatus (e.g. elections, parliament) constitute war. Attacks on ideology such as this have tended to 
be the domain of terrorism or coercion through violence by certain sub-state groups (Chaturvedi 2004). 
However, the internet has enabled foreign states to undermine the core principles of democracies 
through the interruption or manipulation of elections for example. These acts do not inflict physical 
harm or rely on the threat of violence on citizens; however, it can undermine trust in the capacity of 
the state to deliver critical services. As ‘the West’ has attacked autocracies throughout the 20th century, 
there has been a rise in autocracies subverting democracies through the use of modern technology, 
this amount not to physical violence but a form of destruction. 
 
3.3 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a fundamental concept in political science and there is a lot of literature that aims to 
understand legitimacy in different domains: electoral; state; violence; appropriations etc. Legitimacy 
can be defined as, “conformity to the law, to rules, or to some recognised principle; lawfulness. Also: 
conformity to sound reasoning; logicality; justifiability.” This is important because as noted earlier, 
there are rules associated with war. The model of violence (Figure 2 above) de facto introduces this 
through the observer. In relation to war, there are several ‘legitimacies’ that apply, who can use war, 
when can war be used, and how is war conducted. The following section will explore these three forms 
of legitimacy.  
Regarding the who, Bruce Gilley outlines three dimensions of political legitimacy, (i) legality of the 
state; (ii) moral justification of the state; and (iii) consent enjoyed by the state (2012, p.693). Stemming 
from this legitimacy is the nation-state’s right to the use their monopoly of violence. This is a 
Hobbesian/Weberian concept that posits that sovereign states possess the legitimate use of violence 
exclusively (Dillon and Reid 2009, p.83).  
Regarding the when, the relevant body of literature is ‘Just War Theory’, which has its origins in 
roughly 400 ACE (St Augustine). It has since been revised several times, in the 1200s (St Aquinas), the 
1500s (De Vitoria), and most recently and relevantly to Westphalian politics by Grotius in the 1600s 
(Silverstone 2011). Socrates claimed that in practice, states are not able to rule out war, because, 
“firstly every nation must be free to make war in self-defence, and secondly every nation must be free 
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to make war in defence of those whom it is bound in honour or by treaty to protect.” (Jelf 1933, 
pp.104-105).  
Acting outside of Socrates’ framework would constitute an ‘aggressive war.’ Jelf tries to parse the line 
between aggressive and defensive, ultimately concluding that, “no general rule can be laid down; 
every-thing will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case” (1993, p.109). This conclusion 
is necessary because for these matters, context is essential. Modern world politics has determined 
that defensive wars are legitimate; however, initiating a war, for any purpose is illegitimate (UN 
Charter 1945). This acknowledges the importance of the precursors to war as being essential to our 
understanding of war. State A, defending themselves is justified in warring with its aggressor, State B. 
However, State B was unjustified in starting the war. Whilst this has produced a war, the justification 
of said war would require the observance and acknowledgement of which state acted violently first.4  
This is a determination made by the observer from the model of violence (Figure 2). Currently, war 
can only be conducted legitimately through petition of the UN Security Council (UNSC) – the UNSC 
being the observer – who must agree that the petitioned war is legitimate. However, in opposition to 
decisions taken by the UNSC, wars have still gone ahead (Armstrong and Farrell 2005, p.3; Morris and 
Wheeler 2007, pp.214-215). This shows the fragile nature of legitimacy in relation to starting war. It is 
more idealistic than pragmatic.   
Generally, the rules of war are more generally adhered to in terms of how war is conducted, who or 
what can be targeted and through what means. Most IHL is based on the 19th century Lieber Code, 
which introduced the concept of military necessity (Carnahan 1998; Akande and Hill-Cawthorne 2014). 
It provides conventions on when war can be used, and what are acceptable targets and acceptable 
means of warring (e.g. banning certain weapons that are likely to harm civilians). The rules apply to 
many different things, e.g. cultural items of indeterminable value. In terms of infrastructure, it should 
only be targeted if it can be shown that the military advantage outweighs the costs to civilians who 
might also be reliant on the infrastructure.  
The concept of the fog of war is one used to downplay breaches of IHL. It is generally understood to 
be a state in which “even well-intentioned people have a hard time discerning what the right thing to 
do during wartimes is” (May 2013, p.327). However, May acknowledges that “during war, political 
leaders sometimes seem to make these decisions effortlessly” (p.327). Which again points to the 
strategic as opposed to morally justified use of violence in a state of war.  
Military strategy is an important part of this. One of the major developments in strategy has been a 
shift to asymmetrical/guerrilla war, pioneered by Mao ZeDong in China. This was once seen as a 
strategy of large-scale war but has come to be a “political-military strategy in its own right,” according 
to Münkler (2003, p.7). Some of the key components of asymmetric war are: (i) “less military focussed 
and more multidimensional”; (ii) a shift from territory to a human centric focus, borders don’t matter 
as much; (iii) information as a burgeoning tool of power; (iv) war is now protracted; and (v) the 
dispersion of combatants amongst the citizenry, without traditional military targets (Manwaring 2012, 
pp.4-5). This strategy is one of eroding liberalism’s attempts of delimiting civilians from military 
combatants and targets.  
 
4 Recently, the UN has adopted a third pillar of Responsibility to Protect, which is a form of legitimate war to 
prevent mass humanitarian crises. It is seen as a defensive war against the violence on civilians.  
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Overall, states have shown to not be very compliant with norms of legitimacy, Patricia Weitsman 
argues that states “seek legitimisation and international sanction for their actions,” to enhance their 
standing, however, care little about the actual morals behind the use of violence (2014, p.3). This 
indicates that states are willing to put up a façade of adhering to legitimacy, when, in actuality, they 
are willing to use violence in any which way to achieve their goals.  However, this wantonness opens 
the door to it being abused further, especially in terms to the how war is conducted, more so with 
modern military capabilities.  
It has been noted that, “the majority of wartime violence against civilians [is] carried out by 
governments, [who are] more likely to possess the capabilities to kill in large numbers” (Valentino 
2014, p.94). With this in mind and the fact that the nature of violence is changing, to be more in-direct 
and less aggressive, it is possible that governments opt to more readily target civilians, especially as 
there is a strong proven track record of flouting the rules of war. The development of military 
capabilities in the cyberspace have expanded militaries’ ability to negatively impact civilians en masse 
due to their interconnectedness and reliance on modern technology.  
 
3.4 Summary 
At this point, it is helpful to summarise what conventional war is into a simple causal equation.  
𝑋𝑋 → 𝑍𝑍𝑝𝑝 → 𝑃𝑃 
Equation 1: Causal chain for conventional war 
Where X is an act of violence (legitimate or illegitimate), Zp is the damage inflicted to legitimate or 
illegitimate targets, as a direct result of X, and P is a political outcome (desired or undesired). For 
example, X is the launching of a missile. And Zp  is the physical damage caused by the missile (e.g. 
infrastructure, human, psychological).  This is a helpful summary as a causal chain can be mapped from 
the act(s) of violence to the political outcomes. Where the size of Zp is important in 




In 2015, Jovana Davidovic noted that technological developments changed the nature of war. The 
paradigms in which Just War Theory and other definitions of war were developed are no longer in sync 
with the realities of war today. Notably, Davidovic says the “temporal and spatial scope of war,” have 
contributed most to this change (2015, p.603). This has a direct impact on legitimacy and the scale of 
violence that can be inflicted. Technology has also uniquely shifted violence from a primary occurrence 
to a secondary effect. This technology is cyberspace, it is a unique advancement because it is both its 
own, separate domain, but also can be used to dramatically enhance the other domains of war (naval, 
land, air, and space).  
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Defense University provides a rich definition of cyberspace, “a global domain within the information 
environment,5 whose distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of electronics and the 
electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via 
interdependent and interconnected networks using information communications technologies” (2009, 
p.28). This definition raises two important aspects of cyberspace, information, and networks. 
Information that exists on an isolated device would not be in cyberspace as it has no ability to be 
moved around except through some physical manipulation. However, this can be manually breached 
to spread an attack (even through an unknowing agent).  
The UK Ministry of Defence and the US Department of Defence’s definitions are very similar and 
highlight that cyberspace is: complex and dynamic; interdependent with the electromagnetic 
spectrum; global and influential to all military functions on land, sea, air, and space; based on the 
internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers (Theohary 2020, p.1; UK Ministry of Defence 2018, p.4). However, the US Joint Doctrine 
for Information Operations introduces three critical domains, “the physical, informational, and 
cognitive” that enhance this understanding of cyberspace (US Office of CJCS 2012, p.I-1). In 
combination these three designs are the pillars of cyberspace (Figure 3). 
The physical represents: wires, computers, phones, the devices, components, and humans that enable 
the computation and storage of information. The informational dimension is the “content and code 
[…] produced and curated.” The cognitive dimension relates more to the human input, being “thought, 
reason, and decision-making” (Crowell 2017, p.4; Libicki 2009, p.12). This three-dimensional approach 
to cyberspace is common throughout the literature and shall be used going forward. 
 
 
Figure 3: The information environment and cyberspace (Crowell 2017, p.4). 
 
 
5 In the context of this thesis, the definition of information environment comes from the US Department of 
Defence: the aggregate of individuals, organisations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on 
information,” with the Joint doctrine further adding, “there is an electromagnetic spectrum portion of the 
information environment.” (in Porche et al. 2013, p.11).  
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5. Cyberattacks 
Whilst there exists a consensus as to what cyberspace is, there is little agreement or clear definition 
on what a cyberattack is. In its most simplistic form, a cyberattack is the exploitation of a vulnerability 
in cyberspace. There are three critical components of a cyberattack that are relevant for this thesis 
with respect to warfare. The means, the intent, and the impact. A specific type of means could have 
different impacts, sometimes regardless of intent. It has been noted that the impact and intent of a 
cyberattack are more important than the means themselves (McGavran 2009, p.261).  
The US Joint Chiefs, after establishing the US Cyber Command, issued a definition of a cyberattack that 
does not provide much detail about the means and instead focusses on intention and impact.   
A hostile act using computer or related networks or systems, and intended to 
disrupt and/or destroy an adversary’s critical cyber systems, assets, or functions. 
[…] not necessarily limited to the targeted computer systems or data themselves. 
[… it] may use intermediate delivery vehicles including peripheral devices, 
electronic transmitters, embedded code, or human operators. The activation or 
effect of a cyberattack may be widely separated temporally and geographically 
from the delivery. 
(Hathaway et al. 2012, p.824) 
Additionally, before delving into means, intent, and impact, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre 
also makes an important distinction between targeted and untargeted attacks. Whereby an attacker 
either designs and instigates an attack precisely or indiscriminately (NCSC 2016). Untargeted 
cyberattacks tend to be more used by cybercriminals, aiming to cast a wide net to get as much money 
as possible and tend not to be conducted by states; however, this is just a pattern not a rule. More 
relevant are targeted attacks. This is because if it is targeted there is more of an idea of what the 
impact is. It is also easier to link the intent behind the attack, as targeted attacks need to be better 
resourced in order to effectively carry out the attack (Cavaiola, Gompert, and Libicki 2015).  
 
5.1 The Means – How Cyberattacks are Conducted 
There are several ways to conduct a cyberattack. The purpose of this thesis is not to explain these in 
technical detail, however, an introductory knowledge of what these attacks are, is important. A 
summary of some of the most used types of attacks can be found in Appendix B.  
An extremely helpful definition for cyberattacks was formulated by Lin, which is based on three factors, 
(1) Access, 6  (2) vulnerability, 7  and (3) payload 8  (Lin 2012, pp.517-518). This trinity of factors in 
combination make up the means, “the use of deliberate activities [...],” which leads to the outcome, 
“[…] to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks used by an 
adversary or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting through these systems or 
networks” (pp.518-519).  
 
6 Remote access (e.g. over the internet), physical (e.g. undercover agent or manipulated hardware). 
7 Design or implementation flaw exploited, or an introduced flaw (see access), or a bug (“unintentionally 
introduced defect”). 
8 The exploit itself, e.g. a virus that is programmed to alter files or steal information etc.  
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It is critical to stress the importance of vulnerabilities in cyberattacks. Vulnerabilities are the 
weaknesses in hardware, software, physical connections, or human operators that allow for 
cyberattacks to be conducted. Often, human operators are the weakest link; however, there are many 
known cases of exploiting software and hardware that has not been patched that has enabled 
cyberattacks to occur (Oakley 2019 pp.25-39). Differing degrees of complexity and possible damage 
inflicted depend on which vulnerabilities are being exploited and the available resources of the state 
behind the attack (Appendix B).  
 
5.2 The Intent – Why is the Attack Conducted? 
In this thesis, intent can be linked back to Clausewitz’s definition of war and is summarised well by 
Hathaway et al. They explicitly identify two intentions behind attacks, “political or national security” 
(2012, p.826). They go on to also distinguish between cyberattacks and cyber-espionage or cyber-
exploitation, as the latter two do not undermine the functionality of the network or computer and 
instead focus on the extraction of information (Hathaway et al. 2012, p.829). The key take-away from 
their definition is that cyberattacks are political in their intent to target national security apparatus.  
 
5.3 The Impact – What Was the Effect of the Cyberattack? 
An important dichotomy exists within the domain of impact of a cyberattack, whether it is ‘contained’ 
or ‘spread’. Well-developed and resourced cyberattacks can be contained and have a limited reach. 
This may mean that the attack is present on non-targeted devices and networks; however, it only 
activates when specific configurations are detected (Sood and Enbody 2012). Others can be spread, 
meaning that there is an effect on every infected device, this could be roughly equated to a total war 
scenario, this could also be by design too.  
Cyberattacks can have two broad effects on data and information or on physical things that are 
connected. Data and information often underpin how humans and machines behave. Therefore, 
manipulating data can result in suboptimal actions as a result. In terms of physical things, manipulated 
data can cause machines to operate outside of specification and can result in permanent damage (see 
Case study 1). Cyberattack impacts are different than that of conventional kinetic attacks because the 
initial attack does not often produce the direct result. Rather, it cascades into an event that then 
induces some effect. Cyberattacks are unique too in that they can be rendered completely useless if 
vulnerabilities in devices or networks are patched, meaning the attack is useless before it has even 
launched.   
5.3.1 Disinformation cyberattacks 
Whilst all cyberattacks are related to information, an important modern development is the ability to 
directly target civilians through legitimate mediums. Some states have actively used social media 
platforms to provide disinformation and polarise other states’ citizens. This has most notably been 
conducted by China and Russia (Bennett and Livingston 2018, p.132). This is not a new phenomenon; 
it has been readily deployed by militaries in the past and is commonly known as psychological / 
information war (PSYOPS). 
What is novel about the modern usage is that it is now easier than ever to disseminate disinformation 
to people around the world. Over half the world is online and the internet enables this to be easily 
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conducted during peacetime too.  The two prominent and most researched examples of this occurred 
during the 2016 US Presidential election and Brexit vote (Bennett and Livingston 2018; Faris et al. 
2017). The justification for the inclusion of PSYOPS as a cyberattack lies in our definition of cyberspace. 
Critical to it, is both the physical layer, which includes humans, and the cognitive layer, which is the 
human interaction with ICTs. If humans are reliant on information that is provided by ICTs it is vital 
that it is true and accurate for Today, human decision making relies on data provided by and stored 
on digital systems and networks, if these data or systems are compromised, human analysts and 
operators are likely to make poor decisions.  
It is also possible for an attack on non-civilians to use disinformation in order to fool the adversary 
that all is normal when in fact another (perhaps conventional) attack is occurring. Israel successfully 
fooled Syrian air defences that their airspace was clear when in fact, Israeli planes were actively 
destroying a suspected nuclear warhead facility (Geers 2010).  
 
6. Threat-scape 
This section looks at different targets of cyberattacks. Tarah Wheeler said, “the nature of cyberwarfare 
is that it is asymmetric. Single combatants can find and exploit small holes in the massive defences of 
countries and country-sized companies” (2018, p.36). Hence, the broad nature of targets. The 
interconnectedness of state apparatus now means that the state is vulnerable on a scale not before 
comprehensible. Both democratic and autocratic states possess cyber risks. Arguably, there are larger 
cyber risks in democracies which have greater unfettered access to the internet, whereas autocracies 
often provide stringent control and censorship of ICTs (Christensen 2019).  The following are potential 
targets of cyberattacks that would pose the biggest threat to states.  
6.1 Military Targets 
Naturally, military targets are extremely valuable, as disabling these would provide extreme strategic 
advantage(s) in the event of full-scale kinetic war. Militaries have incorporated more portable and 
powerful cyber technologies into more facets of a soldier’s working life. From personal equipment to 
advanced weapons systems (nuclear, command and control, UAVs, and missiles etc.), militaries use 
vast amounts of connected technologies (Nygren 2002; Walrath 2005). The more that militaries utilise 
these technologies, the greater the risk there is that they can be compromised in a cyberattack 
(disabled systems, espionage, and other intelligence). If any of the targets listed in Table 1 below were 
to be compromised by a cyberattack there could be significant ramifications for a state’s military.  






− Air, Land, 
Naval 
Vehicles 






− Secure data 
transmission 












Table 1: Types of military systems that could be potential cyber targets. *Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
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The ability to disable important weapons systems such as nuclear weapons could have important 
implications for traditional theories of war and security, such as nuclear deterrence. If a state is 
unaware they have been cyberattacked, a hypothetical attacking state (A) now knows that its 
adversary (B) no longer possess the ability to use their nuclear warheads. If this is the case, A may 
choose to escalate violence as they are no longer deterred by nuclear retaliation (Unal and Lewis 2018). 
 
6.2 Collective Defence Agreements 
In 2014, NATO affirmed that a cyberattack could trigger collective defence obligations under the treaty 
(Daugirdas and Mortenson 2015, p.211). Consequently, if a NATO member experiences a significant 
cyberattack, other treaty members would be compelled to respond to the aggressor. This decision has 
significant implications for NATO members and if adopted by other collective security organisations, 
such as the UN, there would be even further reaching consequences. 
Whilst not a collective defence organisation per se, the EU, in 2017, acknowledged that malicious 
cyberattacks could warrant a response from member states (Ivan 2019, pp.4-5). The EU Diplomatic 
toolbox does not explicitly sanction conventional war responses but does leave the door open for 
member states to respond within the full range of their legal rights under international law. Whilst 
there are not then obligations for EU-27 members to also aid a targeted state in a conflict (like with 
NATO), they are; however, obliged to provide support using other means (diplomatically or 
economically). 
 
6.3 Critical and Co-Dependent Infrastructure 
Critical infrastructure has been best defined by the EU as “an asset, system or part thereof […] which 
is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social 
well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have significant impact in a […] 
state as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.” (EU Council 2008).9 Bronk and Tikk-Ringas 
highlight that critical infrastructure is often privately owned but requires government intervention for 
its protection (2013, p.91). This creates a unique political situation – whereby something that is vital 
to the functioning of society is no longer the primary responsibility of a government. Naturally, this 
will have complications for cyberattacks and potential political outcomes.  
Jacques Shore describes the difficulties of this relationship in the context of Canada, “responsibility 
for cyber security is shared between the owners and operators of critical infrastructure and the federal, 
provincial, and territorial governments.” (2015, p.241). The first issue is the shared responsibility, 
governments have a duty to protect their citizens but corporations who own these services have a 
responsibility to protect them from cyberattacks too. Continuing, Shore says that, “decentralisation 
can lead to confusion regarding the respective responsibilities of the various agencies.” (2015, p.41). 
This can add to the potential risk as there exists the possibility for unclear accountability and 
obligations. 
Similarly, co-dependent infrastructure focuses on infrastructure that if disrupted would have 
implications for multiple states, due to the interconnected reliance that states have on international 
 
9 Examples include: electricity generation, water treatment, air traffic control, traffic management systems, 
and dams.  
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trade and in some cases shared assets or flow on effects. “The global economy and trade relations 
between countries rely on electronic communications that facilitate ties, commercial transactions and 
transmission of information and knowledge around the world,” these ties could cause significant harm, 
especially for example, the reliance of energy sources (fossil fuels) from overseas (Menashri and 
Baram 2015, p.81). To provide an additional example around energy and resources, if a hydroelectric 
dam in an upstream country was compromised, that could have significant impacts on a downstream 
state(s) in terms of both water flows and electricity needs.  
 
6.4 The Economy / Financial Institutions  
Whilst exceptionally broad, it is important to combine these two domains as financial institutions are 
the backbone to the economy, without which money would not be able to circulate. The European 
Parliamentary Research Service reported that cyberattacks could have a large economic impact, 
estimating the cost of all cyberattack related activities had a total economic impact of €530 billion 
globally (2019, p.1).  
More than this, financial institutions themselves: tax agencies; central- business- and retail-banks; 
payment platforms (e.g. credit cards, PayPal, Klarna); international payment settlement houses; and 
share markets, are potential targets (Kopp, Kaffenberger and Wilson 2017). There are significant 
impacts if these institutions fail. For example, the ramifications for governments if tax agencies are no 
longer able to collect taxes could possibly prevent the functioning of public services. If banks can no 
longer grant access to money it means individuals and businesses cannot function. Similarly, if central-
banks close, business- and retail-banks close. If financial markets crash, retirees could be left without 
a pension, similarly investors all around the world could be stranded. An example of the damage that 
can be inflicted by targeting the economy and financial institutions is explored in greater depth in Case 
Study 3. 
 
6.5 Democratic and Electoral Targets 
Whilst the preceding targets are generally applicable to all government regimes, the following 
disproportionately affect democracies. Many democracies have published warnings about their 
vulnerabilities to cyberthreats, highlighting the international consensus that adversaries can exploit 
different parts of society or institutions.10 Moreover, cyberattacks specifically open up the possibility 
of war, as these fundamental institutions can be undermined without physical destruction.  
6.5.1 Elections 
Elections are at the core of modern democratic societies; they are the gateway to peaceful transitions 
of power and are the expression of the people’s will on how they wish to be governed. They are one 
of the most fundamental democratic functions. The EU Parliamentary Research Service noted this 
 
10 See: Canada - https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/protecting-democracy.html; UK - 
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-defends-nation-against-more-than-600-cyberattacks; Australia - 
https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/australias-tech-future/cyber-security/what-is-the-
government-doing-in-cyber-security; Sweden - 
https://www.government.se/4ada5d/contentassets/d87287e088834d9e8c08f28d0b9dda5b/a-national-cyber-
security-strategy-skr.-201617213; EU - 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/637980/EPRS_ATA(2019)637980_EN.pdf  
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threat, “risks from the digital realm can destabilise governments and political systems, sow societal 
divisions and increase the risk of internal and external conflict.” (2019, p.1). After the 2016 US 
Presidential election and UK referendum on EU membership, there has been a heightened concern 
about the use of cyberattacks in electoral events.  
6.5.1.1 Disinformation 
Thomas Jefferson wrote that democracies should have a well-informed electorate. In this digital era 
where almost all human knowledge exists on the internet, it could be assumed that there would not 
be substantial hurdles to this goal. However, the nature of the internet has enabled the manipulation 
of information.  
One of the issues is that disinformation is spread via legitimate means, mainly through social media 
companies (e.g. Twitter and Facebook; Lazer et al. 2018). Moreover, using the advertising tools that 
these companies provide allows disinformation to be targeted at specific groups of people that can 
lead to socio-political polarisation (Lukito 2019). “The aim is to cause and feed instability, to weaken 
the social fabric within a society and to complicate and undermine decision-making” (Hansen 2017, 
p.10). This could lead to citizens making their decisions on wrong or misleading information. It is 
especially damaging for liberal democracies that are by nature balancing the freedoms of individuals, 
the will of the majority, and minority rights.  
6.5.1.2 Illegal Disclosure of Information 
The other informational attack possible on elections is the disclosure of illegally obtained (hacked) 
information. In the 2016 US Presidential election, this occurred with the Democratic National 
Committee’s emails being released on WikiLeaks after Russian hacking (Rid 2016). Rid, in an article for 
VICE News, was clear (emphasis original), 
“This tactic and its remarkable success is a game-changer: exfiltrating documents 
from political organisations is a legitimate form of intelligence work. The US and 
European countries do it as well. But digitally exfiltrating and then publishing 
possibly manipulated documents disguised as freewheeling hacktivism is crossing 
a big red line and setting a dangerous precedent: an authoritarian country directly 
yet covertly trying to sabotage an American election”  
Whilst there are of course democratic arguments to be made for transparency and openness, the 
central factor of this story is that a foreign state was actively interfering in a democratic election. If 
foreign actors steal and then selectively leak information this could have an influence on how voters 
make their determinations.  
6.5.1.3 Voting Machines 
In some countries, votes are counted on electronic vote counting machines. In theory, these machines 
accurately record citizens’ votes and provide an instant digital tally at the conclusion of the polling 
period. However, because it is digital, it can be hacked, especially those that are connected to the 
internet (Rid and Buchanan 2018, p.11). Rid and Buchanan quote Joseph Stalin to highlight the issue, 
“I consider it completely unimportant who in the party will vote, or how; but what is extraordinarily 
important is this – who will count the votes and how.” (p.11). It has been found that voting machines 
used in the US can be exploited in numerous ways to “manipulate vote-counting functions.” (p.11).  
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If a foreign state manipulated voting machines, this could have large implications for democracies. 
Whilst the solution is simple, revert to pen and paper, for nation-states where there is widespread use 
of electronic and internet-enabled voting machines there is a clear and well-known vulnerability.  
6.5.2 Parliamentary Operations 
Whilst under researched, there have been a few examples of cyberattacks against parliaments. 
Notably in the UK and Australia. In 2019, Australia alleged that China disrupted the running of the 
parliamentary network and the networks of the two major political parties. The attack was serious 
enough for the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD),11 to declare it a ‘C1 – National Cyber Crisis’, the 
first of its kind in Australian history (ASD 2019, p.23).  
There is not any specific literature that addresses the consequences of cyberattacks on parliaments. 
However, the fact that these attacks have been occurring is illustrative of the fact that it is possible for 
these institutions to be taken offline by a hostile actor and that they are a worthwhile target. The 
attack on Australia’s parliament and political parties is illustrative that, should cyberattacks be levelled 
against these institutions, there could be significant consequences for the capacity of legislative 
institutions to complete their work.  
 
6.6 Summary of Targets 
Cyberspace has an unprecedented reach, it has altered the targetability of traditional targets of war 
but has also meant that there are new targets too. Moreover, physical proximity is no longer a relevant 
factor in damaging these targets. In sum, many important military assets are targetable which could 
alter the calculus of warfare by disabling important components of a state’s defence force. 
Additionally, international agreements may oblige third-party states to become involved in a conflict, 
should a cyberattack reach an established threshold.  
Diverging from more traditional targets, critical and co-dependent infrastructures are important 
building blocks of society, providing water, electricity, healthcare etc., ensuring standards of living and 
wellbeing. Targeting these infrastructure could have extremely negative impacts on states or regions.  
Even more broadly, and novel to being targets of warfare, the interconnected nature of financial 
institutions, states’ domestic economies and the global economy means that a cyberattack on major 
corporations or institutions would have profound international impacts. Moreover, democratic 
participation can be readily undermined by foreign interference through cyberattacks. In the case of 
voting machines, this could result in a situation where election results cannot be trusted. However, 
broad based misinformation campaigns can also sow discord and distrust amongst the populace. 
Finally, targeting government institutions themselves could disable governments from properly 
functioning.  
7. Cyberwar 
Cyberwar is a contested topic in political science literature. With some arguing it is overhyped (see 
Libicki 2009 and Rid 2013.a) and others arguing that it should be taken more seriously (Stone 2013). 
As a first point of demarcation, existing literature has begun to break down cyberwar into two distinct 
phenomena, operational and strategic cyberwar. An operational cyberwar is the use of cyberattacks 
 
11 ASD is a SIGINT agency within the Depart of Defence.  
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in the context of a kinetic war, i.e. an extension of existing military operations. Whereas, strategic 
cyberwar is war conducted solely in cyberspace with no other domains of the military included (i.e. 
land, marine, air) (Libicki 2009, p.8).  
Each of these has specific implications for the violence and legitimacy dynamic. Operational cyberwar 
could potentially multiply the violence component, enhancing the effectiveness of kinetic capabilities 
(Libicki 2009, p.139). In terms of legitimacy, the same set of considerations would apply as to the use 
of kinetic weapons. For example, utilising a cyberattack against a combatant would not be considered 
an escalation of physical war, but rather another element in the theatre of war (pp.139-140). In his 
work, John Sheldon implies that cyberwar is of the operational nature. Stating that, “cyberpower is 
complementary,” and “cyberpower is ubiquitous” (2011, p.99) He explains that cyberpower 
“generates strategic effect in all domains so absolutely and simultaneously” (p.99). To the extent that 
cyber is linked to the enhancement of the traditional domains of war, this is true.  
In terms of strategic cyberwar, Libicki states that if a series of cyberattacks (as the only tool of war) 
are used to change a state’s behaviour then it becomes a strategic cyberwar (2009, p.117). Libicki 
rightly argues that cyberwar in the absence of kinetic aid cannot occupy territory. However, potentially 
more open to debate is his dismissiveness of its ability to change a state’s government. As cyberwar 
can focus purely on information, it is possible that attacking democratic processes and institutions 
could result in the change of a government (Rid and Buchanan 2018).   
 
7.1 Cyberwar and IR Theory 
The realist and liberalist paradigms emphasise the need for certainty and clarity of communication. 
However, cyberattacks suffer from an attribution problem which goes to the core of strategic 
cyberwar (Libicki 2009). The nature of the internet allows for anonymity when attacking, the origin of 
the attack is able to be digitally masked or purposely positioned in another place (Oakley 2019).  
Deterrence theory requires clarity of information, however, if a cyberattacker cannot be identified, 
there could be issues with whether or not deterrence could effectively take place. For example, if the 
attacker cannot be properly identified, the targeted state may not know which behaviours to change. 
It is possible there are several aggressors, each seeking different political outcomes, meaning that 
identification is important so that a state could pursue the ‘correct’ course of action. This issue can 
somewhat be eliminated the longer a cyberwar continues as other signals would make apparent the 
actors (Libicki 2009, p.133; Oakley 2019).  
Attribution is also not always publicly declared so that capabilities and vulnerabilities are not publicly 
known. It is in no state’s interest to reveal vulnerabilities until they are patched. Moreover, as 
cyberwar is more likely to be operational rather than strategic, i.e. coupled with kinetic war, publicly 
attributing attacks could result in the use of kinetic warfare against a state, which would be 
detrimental.  
Libicki’s detailed exploration of deterrence in cyberwar can be boiled down into the issues of 
conventional deterrence; clear communication of the red line, capacity to carry out a threat, and 
follow through (2009). These issues can be complicated because states are secretive about their cyber-
capabilities and reluctant to admit being targeted. The security dilemma is a difficult theory to apply 
in cyberwar because it is unclear the capabilities that a state possesses. Importantly, cyberattacks are 
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only possible due to vulnerabilities that can often be patched, so it would be strategically foolish for a 
state to publicise their capabilities because this would flag to potential targets areas in which they are 
vulnerable.  
Additionally, David Benson is developing a new balance of power theory, modernising the strategy of 
handicapping. In this, the connected nature of cyberspace allows for aggressor states to disarm an 
adversary’s military capabilities (Benson forthcoming 2020). This would change the nature of external 
balancing, with states not necessarily needing to bandwagon or balance (form strategic alliances with 
either a potential aggressor state or form a coalition with other weaker states respectively).  Rather 
the calculus would be conducted on newly manipulated military capabilities. For example, if a state 
could successfully prevent another from using their aircraft capabilities, that would alter the calculus 
of an aggressor state escalating their acts of violence (Benson forthcoming 2020).  
In terms of liberalism and the legitimacy of cyberattacks, the main issue is the prolific use of 
cyberspace by non-combatants. Whilst well-designed cyberattacks can limit their impact to only 
targeted devices or networks, (Case Study 1).  It is also possible that, either carelessly or intentionally, 
attacks can spread throughout the interconnected digital world and affect millions of citizens (Case 
Study 3; Sanger 2018; Greenberg 2018). Moreover, recalling the threat-scape for cyberattacks, the 
scope has clearly expanded beyond purely military targets and there are now present dangers in 
civilian infrastructure and institutions. Together, both the broadened scope of targets and potential 
inability to control the spread of a cyberattack, raises issues of legitimacy. Given evidence of 
uncontained cyberattacks, there is a need to reassess how the current understanding of war deals 
with issues of legitimacy, in terms of cyberwar.  
 
7.2 A Causal Chain of Cyberwar 
Many of the coercive effects of cyberwar would be secondary in nature. Meaning that the cyberattacks 
themselves do not directly cause the political outcome desired, rather they induce a secondary event 
that leads to the desired political outcome. This can be expressed into the equation that was 
introduced in relation to conventional war:  
𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌 → 𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠 → 𝑃𝑃 
Equation 2: A causal chain of cyberwar 
Where Y is directly caused by the cyberattack (X) and that results in Zs (outcomes in a secondary sense). 
P would then be based on the size of Zs. The reason this is significant is because cyberwar is able to 
challenge the existing norms of war. Firstly, there is a drastic reduction in direct violence – violence 
through cyberwar is primarily going to result in property damage, rather than human fatalities or 
casualties, which are more likely to be secondary but would depend on what exactly was being 
targeted. Secondly, intwined throughout is legitimacy and who is affected by the attacks. Moreover, 
ZS can now be a broader selection of targets. For a hypothetical example, State A launches a cyberwar 
against State B (X), causing the electricity grid to fail (Y) and as a result people are injured or die (Zs), 
this in turn causes State B to alter their policies.  
If it is the case that cyberwar can produce political outcomes, where diplomatic or economic means 
have failed, then our current understanding of war is missing critical acts of violence taking place in 
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cyberspace. Whilst these attacks do not necessarily have human casualties directly, the ability for the 
attacks to wreak havoc outside of the military realm certainly can.  
 
8. Methodology 
This thesis will utilise a qualitative method approach to answer the research problems proposed 
earlier. A qualitative approach here is motivated by two main reasons. Firstly, that there is an inability 
to source any comprehensive quantitative data on the topic and secondly, that a deeper exploration 
of diverse data will enable a richer analysis with a focus on ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Yin 2009, p.11). This paper 
will utilise a heuristic comparative case study method to develop a ‘soft line’ theory.  
In his exploration of case study methodology, Eckstein argues that case studies are an important tool 
to use when developing theory, especially in relation to macropolitical phenomena, of which war is a 
part (2000, pp.119-120). The use of case studies is important as it can help uncover causal mechanisms 
and provide detail as to how a theory works, grounded in reality. In their exploration of case studies, 
George and Bennett note that case studies offer the ability to provide “contextualised comparison,” 
thus enabling a researcher to better understand why a phenomenon exists (2007, p.19).  
This study design will help illustrate the limitations of the conventional understanding of war in the 
modern context and build a foundation for future research to further develop the issues raised. This 
requires the case study to show the limitation in the existing definition of war and demonstrate how 
changing the definition might provide an improved understanding of war. This has practical uses for 
policy makers and researchers. As has been explored throughout this paper, the nature of war is 
changing.  
The methodology builds on the principles outlined by Eckstein in relation to what he terms ‘soft line’ 
theory, or the breakdown of complex systems into more comprehendible components (2002, p.125). 
Eckstein says that for such a theory to be ‘good’ it needs to “state a presumed regularity in 
observations […], permits the deduction of some unknowns, and is parsimonious enough to prevent 
the deduction of so many that virtually any occurrence can be held to bear it out.” (p.126). Moreover, 
the type of design used here fits into his fourth description of a case study in theory building, that it 
can shed light on the “plausibility, hence whether proceeding to the final, generally most costly, stage 
of theory building [theory testing] is worthwhile.” (p.129).  
The use of a comparative case study is justified for several reasons. Firstly, in terms of war, there is no 
ability for the researcher in the field to manipulate variables experimentally (Yin 2018, p.13) and also, 
the diffuse nature of evidence available, rarely available through official sources (due to the nature of 
national security among other factors). The lack of data is a further justification for utilising Eckstein’s 
approach as there is an insufficient amount of data to thoroughly test theory with any reliability or 
validity.  
By employing Eckstein’s heuristic approach of ‘building blocks’ this study will create different elements 
of a ‘soft line’ theory, that will resemble a theory after looking at the three cases. The heuristic 
approach allows for the “imagination” of the theorist and a recommendation to use a rich array of 
data, and a more thorough investigation of variables which might yield serendipitous relationships, 
those that may not be clear from the outset but emerge from a deeper look (Eckstein 2002, pp.137-
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138). Therefore, the expected results of this study are not a fully formed new theory of war, but rather 
the foundations of what a new theory of war can be built on.  
To achieve this research goal, the analysis must highlight how the existing understanding of war as 
explored in depth earlier fails to capture the reality of how states are behaving now. It must then 
illustrate how a potential new understanding would better enhance both political scientists’ and policy 
practitioners’ ability to conduct research and act.   
George and Bennett note that when conducting comparative case studies, it is important for the class 
of case being analysed to be clearly stated, this ensures that a structured comparison can occur and 
that the same phenomenon is being examined rather than similar but adjacent cases (2007, Ch.3). The 
cases used in this research all belong to the same class of cyberattacks conducted by foreign states, 
that originally targeted another foreign state. 
Moreover, George and Bennett specify two other requirements for a comparative case study, that 
they be structured and focussed (2007, Ch.3). For structure, the researcher should ask standardised 
questions of each case that reflect the research objectives. In terms of focus, the analysis of the case 
must maintain a focus on the relevant theoretical world. Therefore, this thesis will ensure that the 
cases used here are analysed within the framework of war, specifically in relation to the two major 
facets of war discussed earlier, violence and legitimacy. Additionally, the focus will incorporate the 
expansion of possible targets which closely interrelates with violence and legitimacy.  
Equifinality is an issue that political scientists must struggle with when developing theory. It is a 
problem about how similar outcomes have disparate causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2007, 
Ch.8). Despite no two wars being the same, any number of different variables interact in any number 
of combinations; wars typically come to an end either through peace treaty or elimination of the 
adversary (De Franco, Engberg-Pedersen and Mennecke 2019). Within the boundaries of this thesis, 
it will be difficult to fully address concerns of equifinality due to the lack of data available; however, 
some researchers have addressed equifinality within conventional war and further research on 
cyberwar could use their work as a foundation (see Stanley and Sawyer 2009). Moreover, there has 
never been a full-scale strategic cyberwar that could illuminate and offer insights into how such a war 
would end.  
 
8.1 Case Selection 
To achieve these goals, the selection of cases is important. Three case studies have been selected 
primarily because they each represent typical cyberattacks committed by foreign states. However, 
each case also provides a unique factor when comparing cyberwar to conventional war. The 
cyberattacks are: (i) Stuxnet; (ii) Russian Disinformation in the US; and (iii) NotPetya. 
Stuxnet, conducted by the US and Israel on Iranian nuclear facilities, is a clear representation of 
utilising cyberattacks in a means highly reflective of conventional war, where a military would have 
used airpower to disable the nuclear facility.  It is the first attack that was launched digitally and caused 
physical damage.  
Russian election interference in the 2016 US General Election illustrates a modern non-violent form 
of cyberattacks, in which a state’s entire system of government can be undermined without lethality. 
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This type of attack is unprecedented because a foreign state is able to manipulate the free flow of 
information within another state and cause distrust in politicians, democratic institutions and among 
members of society. This attack is increasingly common with Russia targeting the Brexit referendum 
and other European states’ elections. Moreover, China has been known to use similar tactics in Taiwan 
(Wang et al. 2020).  
Finally, the Russian NotPetya attack against Ukraine, which quickly propagated around the world. This 
case shows the extreme end of cyberattacks, a more total war situation, where adhering to the rules 
is no longer a feature of the conflict. NotPetya’s spread wreaked global economic havoc, temporarily 
grounding 20% of global shipping and had other large flow on effects.  
As noted earlier, these cases are not of full-scale strategic war. Whilst utilising such cases would be of 
immense academic benefit, especially for the aims of this thesis, one has simply not occurred, or at 
least one that the public is aware of. These cases, although centred around individual attacks are 
illustrative of the breadth and extent that cyberattacks can be utilised. They provide a critical insight 
into sorts of attacks that could be expected to occur as part of a full-scale strategic cyberwar.  
   
8.2 Data 
The case studies will rely primarily on secondary materials: research conducted by academics, 
journalists, and cybersecurity experts. However, where possible official statements from state officials 
and governmental reports will be used. This is because within this area there is little official data 
publicly available. For example, from the aggressor state’s perspective, they do not want to necessarily 
admit they have attacked another state for fear of retaliation or highlighting their capabilities.  For a 
targeted state, they may not want to declare that they have specific vulnerabilities which they have 
not yet rectified.  
Steps have been taken to collect data from a wide variety of perspectives to ensure that there is a 
triangulation of knowledge. This will enable conclusions to be drawn from disparate starting points as 
lines of focus converge. Utilising multiple sources of evidence is encouraged by Yin, arguing that it can 
result in a more critical analysis and that conclusions from the study are “more convincing and 
accurate” (2018). The limited available data also shaped the type of case study to be concept building 
rather than theory defining. At this time, the available data is not perceived as strong enough to draw 
definitive conclusions. It is rich enough, however, to illustrate the need for further rigorous academic 
research and in this case provide a foundation and framework for an evolution of our current theory 
of war.  
 
  
Uploading War | N. Bell 
Page 26 of 27 
 
8.3 Structured Focus 
For the study to have a structure to enable comparison, the different cases will all be used to answer 
the following:  
• What is the nature of violence in this 
case?  
• Was the attack legitimate?12 
• What was targeted? 
• What were the political outcomes? 
 
These questions relate to the conceptual differences that have been developed throughout the thesis. 
Moreover, through answering these questions the theoretical building blocks will emerge, thus 
fulfilling the aim of this thesis. After exploring each case a comparison will be undertaken of the three 
cases to find commonalities and differences and further build a theoretical foundation. Moreover, the 
causal chains that have been developed earlier will be utilised to explore the contrasting explanations.  
 
9. Case Studies 
9.1 Case 1 – Stuxnet 
For years, Iran has been developing nuclear capabilities, with the US and Israel particularly worried 
about their ability to make nuclear weapons. It has been speculated that the US and Israel would 
eventually conduct a military strike to prevent Iran from weaponising (Sebenius and Singh 2013, p.52). 
Despite, Iran’s assurance, the UNSC and International Atomic Energy Agency were not convinced that 
the programme was entirely peaceful and was, therefore, inconsistent with their ratification of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Bowen and Brewer 2011, p.923). The US President Bush, who did 
not want to conduct an airstrike on Iran and cause another regional war, insisted on an alternative 
method to cripple the state’s nuclear programme (Sanger 2018).  
The alternative was Stuxnet, a piece of malware (see Appendix B) that targeted the Iranian nuclear 
programme, specifically their centrifuges at the Natanz Nuclear Facility (Farwell and Rohozinski 2011, 
pp.23,28; Sanger 2018). The malware eventually spread to thousands of computers around the world. 
However, was designed to only activate when it met a network that fulfilled certain requirements, 
matching the design of Iranian nuclear centrifuges. The malware was delivered to the air gapped 
(never connected to the internet) Iranian centrifuges most likely via an unsuspecting Siemens 
employee or Iranian engineer (Sanger 2018).  
When the malware activated, it subverted control of the centrifuges and forced them to operate at 
speeds and pressures that would cause them to malfunction. The malware also reported back to the 
operators that everything was normal and also prevented digital safety procedures form shutting the 
facility down (Langner 2011). It forced the engineers to start taking unaffected centrifuges offline to 
make sure they were not going to be destroyed too, further crippling the nuclear facility (Sanger 2018).  
Stuxnet is the first attack of its kind in terms of states opting for a non-violent/non-lethal means of 
stopping Iran’s nuclear program (Sanger 2012). It has been argued by military ethicists that Stuxnet 
can be fully analysed within the existing frameworks of conventional war, one concluded that it was 
 
12 As the class of all the case studies is attacks carried out by states it is determined the legitimacy criteria of 
who, being a nation-state, is fulfilled.  
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not an “insurmountable” challenge to argue that the effects occurred in physical reality; and therefore, 
does not need a new conceptualisation (Jenkins 2013). However, Jenkins dismisses important aspects 
of the act of aggression, claiming simply that because the impact occurred in Iran it can fit this 
conceptualisation. This ignores the fact that Stuxnet was not isolated only to Natanz but instead 
spread around the world to non-targeted networks and devices.  
Analysts breaking down the code concluded that there were probably three well-resourced teams 
who worked on Stuxnet. Moreover, it would have required reconnaissance missions and other 
complex intelligence gathering operations to inflict the kind of damage done (Zetter 2014). The size 
of the malware was over 5-10 times the sizes of a traditional piece of malware, which cyber-experts 
say indicates the sophistication and resource intensity of its development (Zetter 2014).  
What is the nature of Violence in this case?    
Ultimately, Stuxnet caused 1,000 or 10% of nuclear centrifuges to be destroyed. However, the 
buildings themselves, as well as lives of engineers and other employees were not harmed, contra to 
what would have occurred if Israel and the US opted for a traditional airpower solution. The leading 
cybersecurity expert that analysed Stuxnet, Ralph Langner, claimed the attack was generic and could 
have damaged chemical plants or powerplants (causing chemical leaks or meltdowns that could have 
threatened civilians) that had a similar technical configuration, he equated it to a weapon of mass 
destruction (2011).  
In a conventional sense an airstrike (X) would have destroyed the facility (ZP). Within the elongated 
cyberwar sense, this act of violence, the Stuxnet attack itself (X), that assumed control of the 
centrifuges (Y), causing their destruction (ZS).  
Was the attack legitimate? –  
There are a few levels of legitimacy that need to be looked at in this case. Firstly, the legitimacy of 
attacking infrastructure. At a broad level, Weinberger concluded that Stuxnet indicated that critical 
infrastructure (around the world) was vulnerable to cyberattacks and that many of these 
infrastructure possess acutely insufficient cybersecurity (2011, p.142). 
Secondly, this cyberattack, despite being against a facility illegally manufacturing weapons grade 
uranium was not sanctioned by the UNSC. Therefore, it is de facto illegitimate within existing 
structures. However, an argument for legitimacy can be made as the facility had been the subject of 
several UNSC resolutions imposing economic sanctions on Iran, due to its repeated breaches of the 
NPT (Özcan and Özdamar 2009). 
Thirdly, this attack relied on using a very significant vulnerability called a zero-day exploit. These are 
serious vulnerabilities that can allow for almost total control of a system. It has been noted by some 
people that exploiting such a vulnerability poses an issue because it means that the state has not 
notified vendors of the weakness and leaves their own infrastructure vulnerable (Zetter 2014, Ch.12). 
This is because the nature of operating systems means that any patches are known around the world.  
Finally, as this cyberattack spread around the world, there was an issue of collateral damage, which 
the rules of law are designed to avoid or significantly minimise. Whilst the attack did not ultimately 
result in damage to any other networks, there is a possibility that if a matching system existed in the 
world it could have been inadvertently affected.  
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What Was Targeted–  
The targeting of a nuclear facility that is producing illegal nuclear weapons does not indicate an 
expansion in the types of targets. It would be expected that within the bounds of a conventional war 
this would be a legitimate target, due to the overwhelming militaristic strategic advantage nuclear 
weapons have, not to mention Iran’s alleged illegal pursuit of them. However, the targeting in this 
case makes it one of the most targeted military actions ever, with zero collateral damage and signifying 
that cyberattacks can be conducted successfully against infrastructure.  
What Were the Political Outcomes? 
This is harder to assess because there has been no official claim of responsibility by either the US or 
Israel. Therefore, we cannot be sure of the expected outcome. Whether that was to merely slow down 
Iran’s production capabilities or if it was to eliminate it. Either way, there has been speculation over 
the effectiveness, with a short-term delay being caused but no longer-term implications (Warrick 
2011). Furthermore, General Cartwright, who’s tenure within the Joint Chiefs at the White House 
spanned the Bush and Obama administrations, indicated that in order for the US to be taken seriously, 
in terms of cyber deterrence, they had to illustrate their capabilities (Sanger 2018, p.32). In this sense, 
the Stuxnet attack not only necessarily achieved the objective of slowing down Iran but also indicated 
to the world that the US and Israel had developed significant capabilities.   
Although, to be effective, deterrence requires clear communication, the fact that neither the US or 
Israel have officially claimed responsibility might limit the deterrent impact. However, most cyber-
experts have steadfastly held that Israel and the US were responsible for this attack. Returning to the 
two equations, in both instances the desired political outcome Iran’s attempts to make nuclear 
weapons were delayed (P), a political goal of both the US and Israel.  
Summary –  
If this case were to be summarised through a conventional lens, it would appear like this:  
Airstrike (X1)  Nuclear Facility Destroyed (ZP)  Nuclear Programme Delayed (P1) 
Versus the cyberwar chain,  
Stuxnet Code Spread (X2)  Control of Facility Systems (Y)  Centrifuges Malfunction (ZS)  Nuclear 
Programme Delayed (P2) 
P is the same in both cases; however arguably P1 would have been longer lasting as ZP >ZS (i.e. more 
damage inflicted).  However, X2 is more legitimate, as ZS has no civilian casualties. The extra layer of 
nuance, Y, allows for a military intervention that was less violent, more legitimate, in terms of reduced 
civilian impact, and could have similar political outcomes. The facility was also recoverable for civilian 
nuclear operations, should that be allowed to continue.  
X2 though poses a different issue of legitimacy, with cybersecurity experts such as Langner suggesting 
that the attack was generic in nature, meaning that the Y component could have produced other 
secondary (unintended) effects, some of which could be entirely unforeseen. For example, if the code 
had spread to an allied state’s infrastructure that had a similar configuration as the Iranians, for 
another industrial control system, it is possible that such a facility would have been impacted too.  
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9.2 Case 2 – Russian Disinformation Campaign (2016 US Presidential Election) 
In 2013, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Valeri Gerasimov, announced the Russian intention of 
using “non-military capabilities to incite chaos and instability” (Ziegler 2017, p.566). This general idea 
was rapidly adopted by the Russian government, with the establishment of the Internet Research 
Agency (IRA; Sanger 2018, Kriel and Pavliuc 2019).13 Russia’s assertive use of cyberattacks has been 
escalating since their annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and its take down of a commercial airliner 
(MH17) in 2014 (Gould-Davies 2020). In response, the US and its allies ostracised Russia, imposing 
economic sanctions and suspended their membership in high-level multilateral talks (e.g. G8). 
However, Russia’s most audacious cyberattacks began in 2016.  
2016 marked the final year of the Obama presidency and the US presidential election. In the lead up 
to the election, there were reports of Russian interference in electoral processes. However, it was the 
decision of the Obama administration to not publicly intervene for fear that that intervention may be 
interpreted as political interference (Sanger 2018, pp.223-225).  
Whilst it might be impossible to ever quantify how much Russian (dis)information campaigns 
influenced the US election, there is no doubt that Russia was trying to manipulate the electoral process 
(US Senate Intelligence Committee 2020.a). The Russian subversion campaign was multifaceted, 
utilising more than cyberattacks. RAND Corp outlines the many ways that Russian apparatus work 
together to subvert electoral processes around the world (Table 2). The most relevant to this case are 
the information and cyber aspects that are highly skilled and prevalent. The table illustrates that Russia 
is utilising cyberattacks as part of a broader suite of diplomatic, economic, and military means to 
destabilise the US. This is a clear use of operational cyberwar.  
 




13 For information on how Russian interference is thought to impact voters, see Hansen and Lim (2019).  
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Whilst going to war over regimes has been a feature of many states’ foreign policy, it has tended to 
be against dictatorships, or specific leaders. However, cyberspace, a domain that was heralded as 
something quintessentially democratic, has enabled democracy itself to be undermined. The Russian 
Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, admitted the use of “information troops,” to disseminate “smart, 
competent and effective” propaganda (Reuters 2017). Moreover, Chekov et al, highlight how Russian 
strategy is clearly evolving to make full use of cyber-capabilities as an offensive tool. This combination 
has led to an effective Russian military influence over information in democratic countries that 
increases during election times (2019).  
What is the nature of Violence in this case?    
 Within this case, there is neither property damage nor physical violence inflicted on US citizens. 
Rather, if it is to be framed as such, violence occurs in the information space, manipulating information 
that voters access. Conventional war; however, has no way of realising this as an act of violence. The 
‘damage’ inflicted is on information and ideas – but democracy also encourages the free and open 
exchange of ideas. This complicates the issue further as to defend against this kind of act is arguably 
antithetical to democracy itself.  
Was the attack legitimate? 
The method of this attack is seemingly legitimate. It utilised both sanctioned platforms and utilised 
freedom of speech. It replicated actions that any American citizen could have done themselves. This 
is because for a democracy, free speech and access to information are fundamental principles. This 
attack is unique is exploiting this very openness to manipulate the information layer and target US 
voters. 
This attack is also unprecedented in terms of its reach, with at least 126 million citizens (non-
combatants) being exposed to the attacks (Isaac and Wakabayashi 2017). The ability to try and affect 
so many citizens poses an important obstacle to using a conventional war framework, especially 
because the operations carried out by Russia were run through the GRU and the FSB and a linked 
agency called the Internet Research Agency (IRA; Mueller 2019; US Senate Intelligence Committee 
2020a.b.).14 This is a clear use of the military carrying out attacks on civilians through means that are 
clearly designed to be used as part of civil society and had no strategic military purpose when originally 
designed.  
Targets –  
This cyberattack had three main targets: voters and the information they receive; the DNC; and voting 
infrastructure. Voters were exposed to thousands of Russian fake news stories and targeted 
advertising. The information space in the US was weaponised where it became difficult for voters to 
distinguish truth from fiction. Moreover, targeted ads polarised people or targeted people to suppress 
voter turnout (Tomz and Weeks 2019; Norris 2018).  
When combined with the findings of the Mueller Report, that the Russian government “interfered in 
the 2016 [election in a] sweeping and systematic fashion,” and, “violated US criminal law,” there is a 
clear indication that American democracy was under attack (Mueller 2019, p.1). One such violation 
 
14 Russian military intelligence and Federal Security Service (formerly the KGB), respectively 
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was the incursion into the Democratic National Committee’s private servers and its subsequent 
release to WikiLeaks.  
Furthermore, it was not just the information space that was manipulated, the US Senate Intelligence 
Committee released a report in 2020 that found that Russia used “extensive activity […] against US 
election infrastructure at the state and local level” (p.3). The report concluded that there was no 
evidence that any votes were changed (acknowledging their insight into this issue was limited), but 
admitted that the Russian government might have been “probing vulnerabilities” in order to 
manipulate future elections (pp.3-4).  
Political Outcomes –  
The aim of the attack was to produce confusion in the US and sow discord between citizens and to 
presumably have a more pro-Russian president elected. Internal turmoil especially from nationalists 
is good for Russia as it means a withdrawal of the US from the international sphere and could have 
broader military strategic intent as Russia can more easily expand their international military presence.  
However, with much of the two official reports classified, it is difficult to determine the exact impact 
that was created. Both reports illustrate the enormity of the Russian campaign, providing insight into 
the intent of Russia’s involvement. The Alliance for Securing Democracy reported that the purposes 
of Russian interference were to co-opt extreme ends of the political spectrum to advance Russia’s 
foreign policy in liberal democracies (Rosenberger and Morley 2019).  
The objectives of Russia’s interference include destabilising NATO by strengthening nationalist parties 
who are generally opposed to intergovernmental organisations, and reducing the allure of democracy 
for other states especially for close European neighbours such as the Ukraine (Ziegler 2017, pp.569-
570; Karlsen 2019). Russia’s more assertive foreign policy goals aim to return it to its former power as 
the Soviet Union, demonstrating that liberal democracy as well as multilateral organisations (that have 
recently been restraining Russia). 
Summary – 
It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to achieve this kind of attack in a conventional sense. 
The absurdity of it becomes apparent when we map it into the equation,   
Manually distribute propaganda and break into facilities to steal information, manual manipulation 
of voting machines; use of military force to coerce voters(!)(X)  Uncertainty about validity of 
election results (ZP)?  Democratic norms and institutions undermined(P) 
It is likely that a physical war would rather have a rallying effect of the citizenry, as they defend their 
territory. However, because it is difficult to detect fake news and its origins, the cyberwar method 
becomes much more effective at creating rifts amongst the public. This could be transcribed as,  
Disinformation and information theft; voting machine hacking (X)  False and stolen data consumed 
by voters; votes manipulated (Y)  Voters Cognition and Behaviour Changes (ZS)  IGOs and norms 
eroded, weakening democratic adversaries (P) 
This type of attack would never be conducted without cyberspace. It is inconceivable that Russia 
would have such a large physical presence in the US to successfully conduct this, distributing 
propaganda and controlling media narratives. Moreover, to manually manipulate enough voting 
machines to change the result would also require an enormous investment in Russian agents within 
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the US. Additionally, coercive military force would be easily met with retaliation from the US. Other 
methods to control or subvert electoral outcomes would require physical destruction of apparatus or 
institutions or the mass killing of civilians which would likely immediately lead to conventional 
retaliation.  
By expanding our understanding through a cyberwar lens, a richer understanding of the attack is 
gained.  This is because such an attack would be inconceivable to have been carried out physically. 
The militarisation of cyberspace allows for the illegal retrieval of information and manipulation of 
voting machines in a much quicker, discrete and effective manner resulting in minimal retaliation. 
Secondly, the direct targeting of civilians (illegitimate targets) through legitimate infrastructures 
(social media) can more easily be understood. Moreover, attacking democratic institutions is now a 
viable possibility. There is no violence in this case. It is nearly impossible to illustrate violence against 
an idea or feeling of trust and this was the goal of Russian interference.  
 
9.3 Case 3 – NotPetya - Russian Cyberattacks on Ukraine 
In 2017, Russian military hackers released, into thousands of already compromised Ukrainian devices 
that used M.E.Doc accounting software, one of the most complex and destructive cyberattacks – 
NotPetya (Greenberg 2018; Nakashima 2018). What originally appeared to be ransomware, where 
data is encrypted and released upon payment, was something far more destructive, was irreparably 
destroyed (Ivanov and Mamedov 2017).  
The cyberattack was part of the continued Russian campaign against Ukraine following Crimea’s 
annexation in 2014. Nakashima reported that the GRU has been launching cyberattacks repeatedly 
against the Ukraine since that time (2018). It has been estimated that there were over €9 billion in 
global damages from significant disruption of industry. Former Homeland Security advisor Tom 
Bossert said that, “while there was no loss of life, it was the equivalent of using a nuclear bomb to 
achieve a small tactical victory.” (Greenberg 2018).  
One of the major companies affected was Maersk, the largest shipping company in the world that 
accounts for over 20% of international shipping. These disruptions to business, banks, and government 
had significant flow on effects. The Maersk disruption alone caused truckdrivers and Maersk’s clients 
tens of millions of dollars in potential damages to their own businesses (Greenberg 2018).  
Violence –  
Whilst it is unclear if anyone died as an indirect result of this cyberattack (X), it did result in the physical 
destruction of data by corrupting the hardware that it was located on (Y) (Greenberg 2018). This 
attacked the physical and information layers of cyberspace. Despite no reports of any harm to 
property or people, the economic flow on effects of this were enormous, as citizens and businesses 
needed to recover their data and were unable to access financial and government services. It is 
unknown whether this inability of people to access their money or other services resulted in any 
adverse effects; however, it is a conceivable possibility.  
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Legitimacy –  
This cyberattack was originally targeted at Ukraine as an operational cyberwar in conjunction with 
their ongoing war with the Ukraine over Crimea. However, the attack exclusively targeted businesses, 
civilians and government bureaucracies that utilised the accounting software, making it illegitimate. 
The massive international propagation of the attack is highly illegitimate as businesses and civilians 
around the world were also impacted, despite having no involvement with the Russia/Ukraine conflict.  
NotPetya highlights how easily a cyberattack like this can jump from network to network around the 
world and wreak havoc as it spreads. Once launched it can only be stopped if networks and devices 
are patched before it reaches them or whole networks are taken offline to isolate themselves.  
Target –  
The attack was targeted at Ukraine, as the accounting software was one primarily used only in Ukraine. 
However, the nature of cyberspace meant that international businesses that had the software on their 
devices in the Ukraine and were connected to networks were also affected. In this way, the target was 
not just the Ukrainian government, financial sector, and economy, but also the international economy. 
In the Ukraine, the second largest bank had 90% of its network and devices taken offline making it 
impossible for people to withdraw cash or make card payments (Greenberg 2019).  
Political Outcomes –  
The political objective was a clear expansion of destabilising efforts against Ukraine in their ongoing 
war over Crimea. Further, it is generally understood that Russia’s goal is to undermine Ukraine’s 
alignment with the EU and cause instability in the region (Greenberg 2018). Russia’s attempt to hide 
the attack behind the guise of old attacks to deflect responsibility is also a key part of this, as they 
attempt not to stoke the ire of NATO and the EU. However, despite their attempts in 2018, Ukraine, 
the US and UK (among others), formally attributed blame to Russia (CyberPeace Institute 2019).  
Summary –  
NotPetya resembles a total war situation; however, the key difference in this situation is that the 
aggressor state had little to no control over the spread of the attack. In this sense, it is an extremely 
illegitimate attack that once launched was known to be able to spread. Compared to physical war, the 
aggressor state is at anytime able to command their forces to stand down. However, a piece of 
malware once released cannot be contained by the aggressor. This introduces a unique dynamic to a 
cyberattack that must be considered.  
If this attack were to be conventionally conceived,  
Conduct more geographically disparate physical attacks (X)  Loss of life, physical destruction, 
massive disruption to global supply chains (ZP)  Economic and governmental chaos (P) 
The conventional means of getting to the same political outcome is highly destructive both in terms 
of human casualties and physical destruction. Whilst these would result in massive economic chaos, 
as society would now have to reorganise into a war footing, it also invites massive retaliation from the 
target states. Moreover, a conventional war would be much slower to inflict this damage 
internationally. Requiring Russian forces to simultaneously attack several nations at once – which is 
also inconceivable.  
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However, when looked at through the cyberwar lens,  
Launch of NotPetya to devices (X)  Hardware wipes data (Y)  Governments, financial institutions, 
businesses unable to deliver services (ZS)  Economic and governmental chaos (P) 
The interconnectedness and inter-reliability of cyberspace on delivering and supporting the local and 
global economies make them exceedingly vulnerable to a cyberattack that can spread across borders 
with minimal effort from the Russian aggressors massively increasing the size of ZS. This form of attack 
means that Russia requires no physical presence around the world to inflict damage, rather a carefully 
crafted attack that propagates itself and inflicts increasing damage the more it spreads. Additionally, 
Russia does not require to move its own economy on to a war footing as a cyberattack does not require 
massive military movements. This means that the P is larger with a cyberattack because the cost to 
Russia is minimal.  
Moreover, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre warned that this could be a “violation of 
sovereignty,” and lead to “countermeasures” (Hern 2017). This illustrates the breakdown of barriers 
between cyberwar and conventional war and illustrates the need for incorporation of cyberwar into 
the understanding of war itself. This is an important development for the largest military alliance as it 
suggests that the nature of war is shifting to a more digital theatre. Their willingness to consider 
conventional retaliation is evidence of the growing concern states have about cyberwar.  
Whilst this attack would have unlikely been conducted conventionally due to logistical and strategic 
obstacles, the nature of cyberspace means that the attack was able to successfully spread around the 
world and result in some equally destructive results without physical consequences. The attack 
conducted either conventionally or digitally illegitimately targeted civilians.  
 
9.4 Results and Theory Development 
Each case presents different characteristics of cyberattacks that have occurred and will likely be used 
in the future. Stuxnet is unique in that it caused physical (non-data) damage. Moreover, it reflects a 
conventional understanding of war, and as noted by analysts, it is a proof of concept attack. Whilst its 
political outcomes only had short-term success, it proved that infrastructure is susceptible. Stuxnet 
highlights a new evolution of military capabilities. A cyberwar lens, compared to a conventional 
understanding, provides a more wholistic understanding of how the attack manifested into political 
outcomes. Moreover, Stuxnet showed that violence, through property damage, still has a role to play; 
however, the violence can be more readily directed to property over humans. Persisting with a 
conventional understanding based on this case would mean the potential for collateral damage is 
ignored.   
Common throughout all three cases, is their failure to adhere to the existing rules of legitimacy. All 
three cases highlight that civilians are vulnerable to cyberattack. Whilst Stuxnet tried to limit the 
fallout by utilising highly sophisticated and targeted malware, it still spread throughout the world and 
could have affected non-targeted infrastructure. Moreover, the two cases of Russian cyberattacks, 
explicitly targeted civilians. Existing political science literature shows, as previously discussed, that 
targeting civilians has long been a feature of conventional war to force political outcomes, so it is 
unsurprising that this is the case with cyberattacks. However, it has historically never been so easy to 
readily target so many non-combatants simultaneously.  
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Importantly, the theatre of war is now every device connected to the internet. The cases highlight that 
this can either be done intentionally through demographic targeting through legitimate means 
(targeted advertising of social media platforms) or with intentional recklessness or total negligence as 
seen with NotPetya. The expansion of the theatre of war to encompass every geography will have 
large implications for the formalisation on any theory of war that more comprehensively incorporates 
cyberwar. The ability to target anyone, anywhere in the world enables both extremely targeted or 
unprecedently massive cyberattacks. The limiting factor of physical proximity or numbers of munitions 
has become de facto irrelevant. Moreover, citizens now bear responsibility for defending themselves 
against acts of cyberwar by keeping their devices updated. The responsibility of militaries to defend 
citizens from foreign attacks has now become an impossibility.  
A revised theory of war will need to factor in to account the erosion of respect for legitimacy in the 
context of interstate war due to the near certainty that civilians will somehow be affected or directly 
targeted. This relates too with the expansion of targets that cyberwar opens. Once abstract and 
intangible elements of society (e.g. democracy; the economy) are now intertwined with cyberspace, 
making them no longer an abstraction but targetable. Whilst these are undoubtedly affected by 
conventional war, they can now be isolated and impacted directly, rather than secondarily. The two 
latter cases highlight Russia’s pursuit of targeting these two areas.  
The two cases about Russian cyberattacks, on the other hand, are unable to be readily explained 
within the traditional conceptualisation of war. In the case of Russian attacks on American democracy, 
it is a target that is incapable of being destroyed by physical means. Ultimately, democracy is an idea 
that has physical manifestations, but it is a belief that people have the right to govern themselves. 
Ideas cannot be shot or targeted by missiles; however, they can be undermined by manipulating the 
information-scape. Cyberattacks allow a foreign state to alter and specifically target (dis)information 
to individuals. This is further enhanced not by the destruction of election infrastructure but its 
manipulation, so that doubt about the process is raised. The manipulation of the physical layer is only 
minor but can have profound Impacts on the cognitive level.  
This is highly reminiscent of the Cold War and the ideological battle between democracy and socialism. 
However, different this time is the way that Russia is able to directly manipulate information that is 
consumed by millions of people simultaneously and also in ways that can be directly targeted. 
Moreover, the possibility of remotely hacking the way vote machines record votes is another 
manifestation of this that could have profound electoral ramifications.  
Together these cases have highlighted the precision and ease that new cyber-capabilities have given 
to militaries. Militaries are experimenting with how they can use these tools to conduct activities they 
would have been hesitant to conduct in a physical means or would be so large-scale as to be 
unfathomable to entertain. Changing human behaviour has become more of the primary object of 
these cyberattack than taking life. Conventional theories of war’s focus on violence and an adherence 
to rules of legitimacy are being usurped by the reality to how state’s are being aggressive towards one 
another. By expanding the causal chain when looking at cyberwar, these changes are more apparent, 
and it allows researchers and practitioners to more fully comprehend the nature of cyberwar.  
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10. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
This thesis has explored war’s enduring links to a physical reality that have existed for millennia and 
still thrive today.  This thesis recognises that this will be a consistent component of war. However, it 
has proposed that the expansion of cyberspace and militaries’ use of it, especially over the past decade 
has had a profound shift in how wars can now be fought. This has been looked at through the lens of 
four components, (i) violence; (ii) legitimacy; (iii) targets; and (iv) political outcomes.  
Through a heuristic comparative case study and four overarching themes, this thesis has suggested 
foundations a new theory of war, centred around the secondary effects of cyberattacks and their 
reduction in physical violence. Cyberattacks enable civilians to more easily be targets of military 
actions. Moreover, cyberattacks enable the wholescale ability to undermine fundamental principles 
of democracy and the infrastructure that enables democracy to function, broadening our 
understanding of what is targetable in war. Additionally, if cyberwar capabilities are ignored, theorists 
and more importantly, practitioners will not be prepared to act either defensively against, or 
offensively with the powerful utility of cyberwar.  
Conventional war has always relied on violence to produce political outcomes, as destruction of life 
and property was (and continues to be) a motivating catalyst of change. States wield violence as an 
organising force internally and attempt to control externalities through violence too. Cyberattacks are 
capable of inflicting property damage and potentially through causal mechanisms that need to be 
researched further, injure humans.   
Legitimacy has been long recognised as another important factor of war, that war should only be used 
defensively and methods that unduly or explicitly harm non-combatants are off limits. The ubiquity of 
digital devices in the lives of humanity now means cyberwar can affect non-combatants more than 
military targets, providing a major need to reassess the rules and norms of war in the digital age as 
seen in the Russian electoral cyberattacks and NotPetya attacks. Whereas, for the most part, rules of 
war in respect to conventional war are adhered to.  
Cyberspace allows for intangible things to become targets such as economies and forms of 
government. The implications of this are wide ranging as states need novel defences for these types 
of attacks but also a different spectra of retaliatory options as responding with conventional weapons 
might be in breach of international law regarding proportionality. Moreover, the ability to disable 
infrastructure without necessarily destroying it is another type of cyberattack that warrants caution. 
Finally, in terms of political outcomes, the cases illustrate the ability to achieve at least some degree 
of political outcome equal to what has been possible through conventional war.  The nature of new 
targets, however, has also opened up the ability to achieve other political outcomes, such as 
manipulating electoral outcomes or hampering economies without being embroiled in long drawn out 
physical war. The digital interconnectedness of many facets of life means that huge disruption can be 
wrought without having to leave the confines of your own territory.   
Through introducing an extended causal chain to explain the nuance of cyberwar, a stark difference 
can be seen between the kinetic and the digital. These cases have illustrated that cyberwar needs to 
be more thoroughly researched. Militaries are no longer solely relying on physical war. With advances 
in quantum technology and advanced AI, the capabilities of cyberwar are only set to expand beyond 
the analysed cased. We are at a point in time with unprecedented technological change and insights 
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into the possibilities of our future capabilities, as theoretical science proceeds what we have been able 
to manufacture.  
This area of research will be plagued by lack of transparency for the foreseeable future. Research can 
only be conducted behind the closed doors of security clearances or after events have spilled into the 
public domain. This will make theory development and testing difficult for academics and research in 
this field will be dominated by actors from within military and government establishments – which 
will have consequences on the neutrality, transparency, and generalisability of this research.  
Future research should explore the links between government policies and military action within 
cyberspace and their political outcomes. Furthermore, how cyberwars are concluded should be 
researched. This thesis has only briefly touched on this issue. However, the end of war and how it 
comes about is vital to understand. Moreover, given Russia’s stance that there is no longer a clear 
distinction between peace and war, rather on-going latent conflict, this will have important impacts 
on the nature of war itself and relationships between states.  
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Appendix A – International Relations and War 
 
Criterion Global Military Power 
Nuclear-delivery capability Intercontinental, triad 
  
Strategic mobility (air and sea) 
Comprehensive inflight and afloat support, 
capable independently of routine continental 
reach 
  
Strategic intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (inc. military satellites) Yes; independent constellation 
  
Cyber capability Comprehensive offensive and defensive capability 
  
Expeditionary combat-air capability Full-spectrum capability at strategic range, including HQ and command-and-control assets 
  
Aircraft carrier Full multiple carrier-strike-group capability 
  
Attack submarines Nuclear-powered with land-attack capability 
  
Amphibious combat Yes; independently sustained, globally deployable 
  
Armoured warfare Comprehensive, independently deployable combined-arms capability 
  
Intervention capability Multiple divisions, all arms 
  
Recent high-intensity combat experience Yes 
Summarised capability matrix from the IISS 2018.  
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Appendix B – Cyberattacks 
Name of the Attacks  Description  Examples  
Reconnaissance Attacks  
Type of attack which involves 
unauthorized detection system 
mapping and services to steal data  
a) Packet sniffers,  
b) Port scanning,  
c) Ping sweeps and  
d) DNS(Distributed Network Services) 
Queries  
Access Attacks  
An attack where intruder gains access 
to a device to which he has no right 
for access  
a) Port trust utilization  
b) Port redirection  
c) Dictionary attacks  
d) Man-in-the-middle attacks  
e) Social engineering attacks and 
Phishing  
Denial of Service  
Intrusion into a system by disabling 
the network with the intent to deny 
service to authorized users  
a) Smurf  
b) SYN Flood  
c) DNS attacks  
d) DDos( Distributed Denial of 
Services)  
Cybercrime*  
The use of computers and the 
internet to exploit users for 
materialistic gain  
a) Identity theft  
b) Credit card fraud 
Cyber espionage  The act of using the internet to spy on others for gaining benefit  
a) Tracking cookies  
b) RAT controllable  
Cyber terrorism  
The use of cyber space for creating 
large scale disruption and destruction 
of life and property  
a) Crashing the power grids by al-
Qaeda via a network  
b) Poisoning of the water supply  
Cyberwar  
The act of a nation with the intention 
of disruption of another nations 
network to gain tactical and military 
advantages  
a) Russia’s war on Estonia (2007)  
b) Russia’s war on Georgia (2008)  
Active Attacks  
An attack with data transmission to 
all parties thereby acting as a liaison 
enabling severe compromise  
a) Masquerade  
b) Reply  
c) Modification of message  
Passive Attacks  
An attack which is primarily eaves 
dropping without meddling with the 
database  
a) Traffic analysis  
b) Release of message contents  
Malicious Attacks  
An attack with a deliberate intent to 
cause harm resulting in large scale 
disruption  
a) Sasser Attack  
Non-Malicious Attacks  
Accidental attack due to mis-handling 
or operational mistakes with minor 
loss of data  
a) Registry corruption  
b) Accidental erasing of hard disk  
Attacks in MANET  
Attacks which aims to slow or stop 
the flow of information between the 
nodes  
a) Byzantine Attacks  
b) Black Hole Attack  
c) Flood Rushing Attack  
d) Byzantine Wormhole Attacks 
Attacks on WSN  
An attack which prevents the sensors 
from detecting and transmitting 
information through the network  
a) Application Layer Attacks  
b) Transport Layer Attacks  
c) Network Layer Attacks  
d) Multi-Layer Attacks  
*Non-state actors 
 
Uma and Padmavathi (2013, p.395).  
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 What Specificity of Target 
Denial of Service (Dos) These attacks overwhelm a specific system so that it can no longer fulfil legitimate 
requests.  Highly targeted    
Distributed Denial of Service (DDos) As above, however, launched from multiple devices or a botnet.  
   
Malware Software (inc. spyware, ransomware, viruses, and worms) that breach a system 
through a vulnerability that can then block access to parts of a network, disrupt 
certain aspects of a system, covertly acquire, and send information 
Targeted  
   
Phishing Sending communications that aim to gather information or other sensitive data 
that can be used for financial gain or more significant exploitation (e.g. 
system/network access).  
Highly targeted 
   
Man in the Middle (MitM) Data exploitation by sitting in the middle of a data exchange between two parties. 
[Espionage]  Targeted 
   
SQL Injection Inserting code into SQL databases forcing a server to reveal information it should 
not normally [Espionage] Targeted 
   
Zero Day Exploit Exploiting a publicly known or unknown exploit in hardware/software on systems 
that have not been updated 
Highly specific, targeted, 
becomes widespread 
   
Sub-verting Supply Chain Compromise software or equipment before it is delivered to a target Highly targeted 
   
Disinformation Actively creating and disseminating disinformation to deceive or polarise a 
population, often utilising free and legitimate social media services.  
Either highly targeted or 
broadly disseminated. 
 
